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Abstract
In this paper we present a novel solution to address the problem of
potential malicious circuitry on FPGA. This method is based on an a
technique of structure extraction which consider the infection of an all lot.
This structure is related to the design (place and route, power grid. . . )
of the integrated circuits which composes the lot. In case of additional
circuitry this design will be modify and the extracted structure will be
affected. After developing the extraction techniques we present a method-
ology to insert detection of hardware trojan and counterfeit in different
IC manufacturing steps. At last an application example using 30 FPGA
boards validate our extraction method. Finally, statistical tools are then
applied on the experimental results to distinguish a genuine lot from an
infected one and confirm the potential of detection the extracted struc-
ture.
1 Introduction
Due to the recent trend of outsourcing integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing and
design, structural integrity verification of ICs has become a hot topic. From the
specification step to that of packaging, and especially during the design step,
a circuit can be corrupted by a malicious adversary. This malicious alteration
of the IC structure is called a Hardware Trojan (HT) insertion and its effects
can range from performance degradation (e.g. denial of service) up to more
sophisticated functionalities (memory dumping etc) [21]. Similarly with the
multiplication of foundries and IC vendors, counterfeits are spreading rapidly,
ranging from simple copies to a complete replacement of an given IC by one of
lower quality.
A HT is composed of two parts: the trigger and the payload. The trigger is
the mechanism that scans some signals within the IC until a specific condition
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is met. When this condition is met, the payload is activated. The trigger
can either be generated externally (external signals or physicals condition) or
internally (a special internal state, data, etc). Moreover the trigger can either be
combinational (result of a logical operation) or sequential (related to a succession
of states). The payload is the ‘malicious’ effect of the HT. It can either be
explicit where of signals are directly added, removed or deactivated. It can
also be implicit where the effect cannot be directly observed like, for example,
adding side-channel information in the power consumption. The detection of
a HT before its activation is a difficult task and it still remains a challenging
problem even after its activation when the payload is implicit.
The probability of triggering a HT during functional tests is low and testing
is an expensive approach to that end. Moreover, inspecting the circuit through
reverse engineering is an expensive process in terms of cost and time and can
be destructive. This solution can therefore be applied to only few devices, even
though latest imaging based methods have proven to offer a simpler and faster
alternatives [9].
Several non destructive methods for HT detection have been recently pro-
posed. The first proposed approaches analyze, using statistical techniques, the
overall consumption of an IC to detect the impact of the HT. For example,
in [2], a detection technique based on the Karhunen-Loe`ve theorem is proposed
in order to detect the power consumption of the HT within process variations
and noise. However, this paper only reports validations obtained by simulations,
omitting things like the measurement noise. Moreover, the technique may not
scale to complex Systems on Chip (SoC).
Hence, in order to enhance the detection capabilities, techniques have been
proposed in [14] to analyze locally the propagation delays of logical paths with
embedded monitors. However, once again, only simulation results are provided.
Another method has been proposed in [1] to integrate a hardware system al-
lowing to monitor important nets of ICs. However, little information is given
in this paper about the efficiency of the proposed technique. In parallel to this
approach, a test solution was also proposed in [8] in order to trigger easily a HT
or at least to increase their electrical activity.
In [16], a first attempt to suppress process variations from the HT detection
problem has been proposed based on the strong correlation between the max-
imum operating frequency of ICs, Fmax, and their dynamic power consump-
tion. This approach however faces the difficult problem of measuring Fmax on
SoCs [5, 17].
Then in 2011, the use of Ring Oscillators (RO) has been proposed to detect
HTs. For example, in [13] the authors propose an analysis of RO sensitivity to
the presence of HT but conclude that it seems difficult to detect really small
HT. In parallel [24] proposes the use of an array of RO, used in conjunction with
a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [10], to distinguish infected ICs from
genuine ones. This proposal has been experimentally validated on an FPGA
using a Digital Sampling Oscilloscope (DSO) (thus off-chip) to measure the
oscillating frequency of ROs. This idea has then be applied to design an ASIC
in 2012 [11] where the initial results were only partly validated. This is may
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due to the use of an embedded 8-bit counter as RO, which reduces the accuracy
of the measured frequencies.
Later in 2013, the authors in [6] propose to cluster, during the design step,
the power grid in several voltage islands embedding each a dedicated sensor to
enhance the detection capability. However, no experimental results are given
in this paper, neither on the improvements obtained nor on the cost in terms
of Silicon area. In 2014, [19] describes a method based on the use of near field
electromagnetic cartography. Yet, the authors conclude that it seems difficult to
detect all the HT. However, in [3], a more efficient technique is used to interpret
the EM traces. As a result, authors conclude it is possible to detect really small
HTs but with a special care to control the temperature during measurements.
Finally, in [23] the authors analyze EM emanations from FPGAs and succeeds
to differentiate a genuine population from an infected one.
Based on those results, the on-chip monitoring solutions seem relevant in
term of efficiency since the obtained detections rates are higher than for off-chip
methods. Furthermore, these solutions seem industrially viable since the cost
of the equipments, dedicated to the data acquisition, is reduced as the tests can
easily be done in parallel. For those reasons, the work presented here is based
on on-chip methods.
In this paper, we consider that the infection of a single device is not realistic
based on the current life cycle of ICs (mainly linked to production and distri-
bution constraints). That why the HT detection methodology proposed in this
paper does not aim at establishing if an IC is infected but aims at checking
the integrity of a whole production lot. Moreover, this approach also allows to
determine if a given IC is a counterfeit (apart from the case of a really high
quality copy). The principle of the proposed methodology is to detect, thanks
to a embedded sensor network, an alteration in the design’s structure induced
by the presence of a HT, or by a modification in its place and route or in its
floor-plan. These alterations modify the IC power distribution and in particular
the static voltage drops [15] in the glue logic and hence that in the sensor array.
This method is based on a novel variation model of the performance of CMOS
structures in real designs (not in test chips dedicated to the fine measurement
of the intra and inter die variations), model which is introduced and validated
in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. First, section 2 describes the threats to
IC integrity and specifies which ones are covered in this paper. Then section
3 introduces the proposed variation model and defines the basic principle of
our detection methods. Section 4 details the HT and counterfeited detection
methodology and section 5 describes the experimental results which validate
the proposed approach and the proposed variation model on a set of 30 FPGAs.
Finally, the wide range of perspectives generated by our approach is discussed,
as a conclusion, in section 6.
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Figure 1: Mains threats to IC integrity
2 Threats and characteristics of infected devices
and counterfeits
First, this section recalls briefly the main threats to IC integrity. Second, the
HT and counterfeit detection method is described specifying which threats it
covers.
2.1 Threats to IC integrity
Fig. 1 summarizes the different steps, from design to exploitation, for manu-
facturing an IC and the associated threats. The first vulnerabilities are at the
design stage. A corrupted piece of hardware IP can be introduced into the prod-
uct (Threat (1) in Fig. 1) or a compromised employee from the design center can
introduce a HT into the HDL description (Threat (2) in Fig. 1). It is difficult
to protect against such threats, but some solutions based on ad-hoc design and
verification methods have been proposed [7, 18,22].
The second vulnerable stage is the manufacturing (Threat (3) in Fig. 1).
For example, filler cells can be substituted by logic gates, inducing a denial of
service or more complex functionalities, or a fuse can be disabled etc. A last
threat is that of counterfeits. It consists in selling second hand products, lower
quality devices or functional copies directly onto the market causing financial
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losses (Threat (4) in Fig. 1). Some can even be almost perfect copies which are
difficult to detect.
2.2 Features of infected circuits or counterfeits
Many methods have been proposed to detect HTs. Among them, a large major-
ity aims at detecting the parasitic electrical activity (additional power consump-
tion) generated by the HT’s trigger. However, this parasitic electrical activity is
not the only measurable trace left by the HTs. Another one is the alteration of
the inner structure of the IC. For example, the HT insertion modifies the local
and global capacitance and resistance of the power and ground nets. This mod-
ification induces a different current flow in the IC, and thus a different static or
dynamic voltage distribution (static or dynamic voltages drops).
In the same way, counterfeits are characterized by a more (functional copies)
or less (almost exact hardware copy) different physical structures, and therefore
by a different repartition of the voltage across the IC’s surface.
3 Principle of HT and counterfeit detection
Our detection method is based upon a simple principle: a fingerprinting of the
supply voltage on the surface of IC at rest (i.e. just powered on with the clock
active). In order to do this, a network of sensors is uniformly spread over the
whole IC surface to get a cartography of the inner supply voltage. Any sensor
sensitive to the supply voltage, V dd, can be used. In the experiments reported
in section 5, Ring Oscillators (RO) are used. Given that the frequency f of a
RO is sensitive to the local V dd value, the distribution of measured values for
f above the IC surface, in the absence of any process variation (P), is a direct
picture of the V dd distribution. Hence in our approach, we have to get rid of the
effect of intra-die and inter-die process variations. With this approach, we shall
be able to mitigate risks linked the introduction of HTs at the manufacturing
stage.
3.1 Process variation model and performance variation
model of CMOS structures
Given p, an inherent parameter of the IC fabrication technology, the impact
of the manufacturing process variations, the so called process variations, are
generally described as follows:
p = p¯+ ∆pinter + ∆pintra (1)
with p¯ being the mean (or typical) value of the parameter on a whole lot of a
production, ∆pinter ∼ N(0, σ2inter) the effect of the inter-die variations assumed
normal and ∆pintra ∼ N(0, σ2intra) the impact of variations within a die, i.e. the
intra-die process variations also assumed normal.
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This process variation model is well known and widely adopted to simulate
the effect of process variations on the parameter p of an IC (a transistor, a re-
sistance, a pn junction, etc). However, the extraction of the standard deviation
values σintra and σintra is generally performed on dedicated ICs (regular arrays
of MOS transistors [12] or SRAM cells [4]) which are quite uniform relative to
their physical structures and under controlled voltage and temperature. This
process variation model does not take into account the impact of the IC’s phys-
ical structure (power supply routing, local transistor density, etc) on the CMOS
gate performance or on that of an embedded sensor which, of course, depends
on all process variations through equation (1). Hence for our case, we shall use
the following variation model for the output value T (xi, yi) of a sensor i located
at (xi, yi) on the IC’s surface:
T (xi, yi) = T¯ + ∆Tinter + ∆Tintra + ∆T (xi, yi) (2)
where ∆T (x, y) is a deterministic value which depends of the sensor’s position
over the IC, and which models the impact of the IC’s structure on the per-
formance of the sensor. To ease the reading, T (xi, yi) and ∆T (xi, yi) shall be
noted Ti and ∆Ti respectively, showing that the variation model considered in
this paper is a spatial model.
3.2 Fingerprinting the IC’s structure
Considering the model given by equation (2), fingerprinting the structure of a
design featuring a network of q sensors regularly spread on its surface is relatively
simple for a same manufacturing lot of ICs. The q values of ∆Ti are calculated
by averaging the impact of the process variations on mlot devices of the same
lot:
∆̂Ti =
1
mlot
·
mlot∑
j=1
T ji − T¯ =
1
mlot
·
mlot∑
j=1
∆T ji (3)
σ∆Ti =
√√√√ 1
mlot
·
mlot∑
j=1
(∆T ji − ∆̂Ti)2 (4)
where:
T¯ =
1
mlot · q ·
mlot∑
j=1
q∑
i=1
T ji (5)
T ji is the measurement of the output of the sensor i of the device j ∈ {1, . . . ,mlot}
of the considered lot.
With these notations, the vector SDesign = [sDesign1 , . . . , s
Design
2q ] can be de-
fined as follows:
SDesign = [∆̂T1, . . . , ∆̂Tq, σ∆T1 , . . . , σ∆Tq ] (6)
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SDesign represents the fingerprint of the physical structure of an IC called ‘De-
sign’ and is by construction independent of the process variations. This fin-
gerprint is the base of the HT and counterfeit detection methods proposed in
section 4.
4 Detection Methodology
The starting point of our methodology is the addition of a network of sensors
sensitive to the supply voltage. Those sensors are placed so as to cover most of
the IC’s surface. The granularity, i.e. the distance between two sensors, is chosen
by the IC designer depending on the trade-off between detection capability and
cost.
When the first run or the test run (which are less likely to be infected) is
received, the integrity of some devices is verified to qualify the whole lot. This
could be done by applying reverse engineering methods or by using optical based
methods [20]. Once the first production lot is qualified, the signature (see eq.
(6)) of the design is calculated using equations (3) and (4). This fingerprint
constitutes the reference fingerprint for the considered design.
The designer will then usually order other runs (“production runs”) from
the same foundry or from another one which offers the same technology node.
Once those new production lots are received, their corresponding fingerprints
are calculated and are ‘compared’ with the reference one in order to verify that
the newly received lots have not been corrupted. Ageing techniques could be
applied to this reference lot to derive fingerprints of the design at different ages.
In the same way, at some (later) point in time, the designer can have ‘field
returns’ which could contain counterfeits. With the reference fingerprint, the
origin of these devices can be verified without application of expensive, complex
and destructive methods. In order to do that, the designer extracts the finger-
print of the suspected device and compares it with the reference fingerprint to
finally get a probability that the device is a genuine one. If the probability is
too low, complementary analyses (like reverse engineering) can be applied.
The above procedures require the comparison of the reference fingerprint
with that of a new production lot in order to detect the eventual presence of an
HT (case 1). The procedures also require the comparison of the reference finger-
print SREF with the fingerprint of a single device in order to detect counterfeits
(case 2).
4.1 Case 1:HT detection
When the integrity of a new lot of devices has to be checked, the first step is
to calculate its fingerprint SNewRun. Since this signature shall be, in practice,
calculated using a high number of devices (> 100), the estimate of means can
be considered as reliable. It is therefore possible to apply distinguishers or a
statistical tools working on the means, like the Difference of Means (DoM) or
the T-test (and more precisely the Welch’s test). This implies using the ∆̂Tis
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of the signatures (eq. (6)) and to analyze the values
∆̂Si = S
Ref
i − SNewRuni (7)
for i = {1, . . . , q}, or that of
T Stati =
SRefi − SNewRuni√
(sRefq+i )
2
mlot
− (s
NewRun
q+i )
2
mlot
. (8)
It is also possible to use other statical tools such as the Kolmogrow-Smirnov
test (KS) to determine if the distributions for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,mlot} of (Tji − T¯)
for the reference lot and for the new one are drawn from the same distribution
law, i.e. if the devices embed the same design or not.
With the same idea of comparing centered populations of (Tji − T¯), clustering
solutions can be used such as the k-means (with k = 2) or using simply the
median. To do this, the populations (Tji − T¯) of the reference lot and of the
new lot are merged within the same set. Then, the k-means is applied on the
resulting population (or the median is calculated) so that to split it into two
clusters. Finally, the number of devices in each cluster coming from the reference
lot and from the new one are counted. If the tested ICs are genuine, the two
resulting clusters have the same number of elements from the reference lot and
that of the new lot. More precisely, if the cardinals of the reference lot and that
of the new lot are equal, 50% of the devices from the reference lot and 50% of
the devices from the new lot have to constitute each cluster. If this is not the
case, the new lot can be considered as different from the reference one.
4.2 Case 2: counterfeit detection
The case of the suspected ‘field return’ is more difficult to treat as the fingerprint
as described so far for HT detection cannot be calculated on one single device:
we only have the TSuspectedi of the considered device. In this case, we first
“recenter” all the values using the value T¯Suspected of the suspected IC (i.e.
calculate TSuspectedi − T¯Suspected) and then calculate the probabilities that each
TSuspectedi values comes from the normal distribution:
N(0, (sSuspectedq+i )
2) = N(0, σ2
∆̂Ti
) (9)
σ
∆̂Ti
is indeed the standard deviation of the sensor i, value estimated with the
ICs from the reference lot. The probabilities for all sensors are then combined
(and more precisely a multi-normal distribution is defined with all σ
∆̂Ti
) to
obtain the probability that the considered device is a genuine one.
5 Experimental results
The HT detection methodology has been experimentally tested on a set of 30
FPGA boards featuring a Xilinx Spartan3E-1600. 15 boards have been used
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Figure 2: From left to right: 3 implementations of the same HDL-code without
any HT. The rightmost picture is an infected (LFSR) version of Design 1.
as genuine ICs and 15 have been used in order to emulate an infected lot or
counterfeited devices. Validation of our methodology using FPGAs is a first
step before entering the long and costly process of designing an ASIC.
5.1 Experimental protocol
On each Spartan-3E-1600 FPGA, a 128-bit-key AES, an RS232 communication
block and a Finite State Machine (FSM) have been placed and routed. An
array of 60 ROs has been added to the design. Each RO is coupled with a
clock divider by two so as to be able to observe and measure precisely the 60
frequencies on an IO pad through a multiplexer. The area overhead incurred
by the addition of our on-chip detection hardware is about 3.2% of the FPGA
resources. The frequency measurements are performed with an oscilloscope from
Lecroy featuring a 4GHz bandwidth and a 40GS/s sampling rate.
In order to obtain accurate measurements (accuracy of ±0.025ps), each fre-
quency estimation is done by measuring the duration equivalent to 100 periods
and by repeating this experiment 100 times to obtain a mean value of the pe-
riod of each RO: T ji . During these measurements, the IC is kept inactive, i.e.
just powered on and with the clock running. The time spent to measure the 60
values T ji on a board is lower than 30min which is short enough to consider the
temperature as constant in a laboratory environment. In order to guarantee a
good stability of the supply voltage, the FPGA is powered by a stabilized dc
supply source with an accuracy of 0.05%.
To emulate the effect of a HT, a 64-bit LFSR is used. It occupies an area
of 48 slices which represents 0.32% of the FPGA’s surface (see the rightmost
picture of Fig.2). Note that the AES alone is mapped onto 1778 slices. The
LFSR is clocked at 50MHz by taking the clock input of a D Flip-Flop of the
AES. This HT can therefore be considered as a sequential HT.
To emulate counterfeits, several constrained place and route steps of the
design are performed. Fig. 2 gives 3 different floorplans of the same HDL code
(three leftmost pictures). One of them (Design 1) is considered as the original
/ genuine design, the two others as counterfeits.
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(a) 
(b) 
Figure 3: Impact of inter-die (a) and intra-die (b) variations
5.2 Estimations of σ2inter and σ
2
intra
Before evaluating the relevance of the proposed methodology and thus the rel-
evance of the proposed variation model of CMOS structures, the impact of the
inter and intra-die variations have been estimated on the 30 FPGA boards.
Fig. 3(a) gives the histogram of the periods (Tji) for the 60 ROs on ten boards,
i.e. ten different devices. One can observe that the mean period for each device
varies from 13.5ns to 14.5ns. The impact of inter-die variations is therefore of
the order of several hundreds ps. Hence, using data from 30 boards, we estimate
that the inter-die impact, can be modelled by the following normal distribution
N(0, σ2inter) with σ
2
inter = 460ps.
Fig. 3(b) shows the histograms for the measured periods (centred for each
board) for the 60 ROs values and this for the same ten boards. On can observe
that the intra-die variations have an impact of the order of a hundred ps. Based
on those assumptions, the intra-die variations can be considered to follow a zero-
mean normal distribution and can be modeled by N(0, σ2intra) with σintra =
130ps.
5.3 Validation of our variation model and Counterfeit de-
tection
In section 3, we introduced a variation model for the performance of CMOS
structures and for that of sensors. This model is novel as it introduces a deter-
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Figure 4: (a) SDesign1 in blue and the 15 specific fingerprints associated to the
the 15 boards used to compute SDesign1 (b) Fingerprints of the three designs
reported Fig. 2
ministic term which expresses the impact of the design structure on the sensor
and particularly the impact of the power distribution. This novel model being
the base of the proposed detection method, we start by evaluating its relevance.
In order to do that, the frequency of the 60 ROs from the 3 leftmost designs
shown in Fig. 2 have been measured on 15 boards. Then, the first half of
their fingerprints SDesign (i.e the ∆̂Tis) have been compared. Fig. 4(a) shows
SDesign1 (dark curve) and the unique fingerprints (dotted curves) for each of
the 15 devices used to compute SDesign1. Fig. 4(b) shows the three fingerprints
obtained from the three designs. One can observe they are significantly different
despite the use of the same 15 boards. One can also observe that the designs 2
and 3 have significantly different fingerprints (which are in turn different from
that of design 1) even though the two floorplans are relatively similar. Note
that in Fig. 6(a) (dotted curve), we see that the signatures corresponding to the
same design obtained from two different lots of 15 FPGA are the same.
For these designs 2 and 3, the sensors 30 to 45, located in the neighborhood
or in the AES (see Fig. 2), are characterized by high si = ∆Ti values. For the
design 1, the AES is around sensors 1 to 10 (see Fig. 4(b)). This reinforces
the hypothesis that the floorplan influences the sensors by modifying locally the
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Figure 5: SDesign1 and signature of a counterfeit
distribution of supply voltage even when the IC does not compute anything.
At this point, we see that our variation model of CMOS structures is valid
and allows to distinguish different floorplans of a same HDL code. To show that
our method can determine whether a suspected IC is a counterfeit (compared
to a reference lot), we shall refer to Fig. 5 which shows the complete fingerprint
(calculated from 15 samples) of the design 1 (dark curve), i.e. the values of
∆̂Ti ± σ∆̂Ti , and the fingerprint of a suspected device (dotted line). In this
case, there are visually no doubt that the considered device is a counterfeit.
For example, the ROs 30, 39 and 40 are out of the ±3 · σ
∆̂Ti
measured on the
reference lot. It is the same for the ROs 1 and 44.
5.4 HT detection
The detection method of an infected lot is similar to that of a counterfeit lot,
although the alteration of the physical structure is expected to be significantly
smaller and localized. Fig. 6 shows the results obtained by applying the DoM
(upper picture) and the T-test (lower picture) in order to verify the integrity
of the 15 infected and 15 genuine ICs with the 15 reference ICs. 30 boards
are used. To emulate the infection (the presence of a sequential HT), a 64-bit
LFSR (48 slices) has been added to the design 1. Both the DoM and the T-test
allow to detect an anomaly located around RO 33 which is effectively close to
the LFSR. Moreover, the DoM stays low between the reference and the genuine
lots. In this case, the absolute T-values (| T Stati |) does not exceed, 1.22 for
i ∈ {1, . . . , 60}. Genuine lots are therefore recognized as uninfected lots. Similar
results have been obtained with the k-means (Fig. 8) and the median (Fig. 7).
These results validate the proposed detection methodology and above all the
proposed variation model of the performance of a CMOS structure in a real
design which strongly depends on the power distribution in advanced CMOS
technologies.
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Figure 7: Percentage of a cluster (made by median) that come form the reference
lot
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Figure 8: Percentage of a cluster (made by kmeans) that come form the reference
lot
6 Conclusion and perspectives
This paper introduces an efficient and practical approach for detecting Hard-
ware Trojans in ICs and counterfeits based on a new variation model for the
performance of CMOS structures. This model gets rid of the process variation
issues usually met when doing HT detection in practice. The model is actu-
ally built from measurements made on ‘real circuits’ and not designs usually
dedicated to the monitoring of process variations, the latter being much more
uniform and regular in terms of physical structure and content. This approach
is based on the assumption that IC infection is more likely to be done on a lot
level than on individual isolated ICs.
A reference signature is first derived from a trusted lot (which could corre-
spond in practice to a first run usually done for characterisation purposes). Then
the same signatures will be calculated on subsequent (suspected) lots and com-
pared with the reference one, using the different statistical methods described
in this paper. For counterfeit detection, we propose a way of calculating this IC
fingerprint and comparing it with the reference signature. The model and the
methods have been successfully experimented on a set of 30 FPGA boards as
an initial validation strategy.
The next steps will be to implement the on-chip sensor structures on an
ASIC design and validate the method on large set of ICs. Moreover, other
factors like the size of the HT, the density of sensors to used or the positioning
of those sensors shall be investigated.
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